可重新谈判期权无法阻止两个利润最大化前沿 LLM 代理间的套牢问题
原标题：Renegotiable Options Fail to Prevent Hold-Up Between Two Profit-Maximizing Frontier LLM Agents
AI 摘要
研究让 Claude Opus 5.5 与 GPT-6.1 Sol 两个以利润最大化为目标的 LLM 代理，在相同博弈结构下进行一次性博弈，测试四种合同机制。结果显示，在人类实验中能把投资率从 41.5% 提升到 67.2% 的「可重新谈判期权」，在代理之间完全失效，投资率为 0%；只有在排除重新谈判的固定期权下，所有卖家才选择投资。作者指出，依赖人类行为（如合同作为参照点）的合同条款，未必能在利润最大化的 AI 代理之间保护关系专用性投资。
正文节选
Renegotiable Options Fail to Prevent Hold-Up Between Two Profit-Maximizing Frontier LLM Agents Abstract Do contract terms that protect investment between people also protect it between profit-maximizing language-model agents? In the hold-up problem, a seller can adapt a unit to one buyer at a cost before the price is set. Once that cost is sunk, the buyer can offer almost nothing and the seller will still accept, so a seller who foresees this does not adapt. One remedy is an option: the buyer ma