委托困境：规模经济、问责与多中心治理
原标题：The Delegation Dilemma: Economies of Scale, Accountability, and Polycentric Governance
AI 摘要
该论文研究集体行动系统中委托与问责之间的张力，提出一个规模-问责权衡模型：群体越大，成本分摊收益越高，但中心保留单个成员的价值越低，导致剥削风险上升，只有在一定问责规模内退出威胁才能维持非剥削性委托。作者用LLM智能体进行30个智能体的五组配对模拟，发现多中心结构反复涌现但保持流动，呈现集中、剥削、退出与重组的循环，且不同能力模型在行使权威上差异显著。
正文节选
M. Baldoni, F. Fang, W. Yeoh, N. Yorke-Smith (eds.) \submissionTypeResearch Paper Track The Delegation Dilemma: Economies of Scale, Accountability, and Polycentric Governance Abstract. Many collective-action systems are neither fully decentralized nor fully centralized: agents voluntarily organize into institutions that share organizational costs and delegate decisions to representatives. Delegation can reduce individual costs, but it also transfers control to representatives whose private objec